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CASE LAW NOTE
The Right to VAT Deduction and the ECJ: Towards
Neutral and Efficient Taxation in the Single Market?
Marton Varju*
The right to deduct input VAT is recognized in the VAT Directive as well as in the corresponding jurisprudence of the ECJ as a fundamental
component of the EU VAT system. It ensures the neutrality of taxation in the common system of VAT and, through that, equal treatment and
undistorted competition in the single market. The exercise of the right of deduction may, however, undermine the efficient operation of national and,
with that, the EU system of turnover taxation. The Member States may be prevented from collecting the revenues due in their national territory or
addressing fraud and other abusive conduct that threaten the interests of national and EU public finances. In response to these challenges, ECJ case
law has made considerable efforts to give effect to both the market integration and the tax efficiency objectives of the common system of VAT and
reconcile the relevant legal rules. Developments in recent judgments seem to ensure that the concerns of Member States which face severe problems with
the efficiency of VAT as a result of widespread practices of fraud may also be taken on board.
1 INTRODUCTION
This article analyses the development of the right to
deduct input VAT in the jurisprudence of the EU Court
of Justice (ECJ) and its contribution to the emergence of a
system of turnover taxation in the integrated European
economy that is neutral as well as efficient. With its
origins in the principle of fiscal neutrality, the right to
deduct has been interpreted as a fundamental entitlement
of economic operators which gives effect to the neutrality
principle and, thus, ensures equal treatment and undis-
torted competition in the single market. Its enforcement,
which also receives support from the principle of legal
certainty, has interfered considerably with the delivery of
tax policy objectives in the Member States which aim at
ensuring the efficient operation of the national and, with
that, the EU VAT system. This presented an acute source
of conflict within the common system of VAT – that
between its market integration and tax efficiency objec-
tives – to which the ECJ reacted by giving more weight to
tax efficiency considerations when applying the legal prin-
ciples governing VAT deduction. This jurisprudential
move proved to be controversial and the ECJ approach,
limited by the objectives and rules of the EU VAT
Directives, has remained cautious. Developments in recent
case law, however, seem to raise the possibility of giving
further consideration to the problems faced by national
tax systems, including those where the VAT system is
severely compromised by widespread practices of fraud
and other abuse.
The analysis is structured as follows. The article first
examines the regulation of the right to deduct under EU
law and the legal characteristics acquired by that right in
judicial interpretation. This is followed by an analysis of
jurisprudential developments which enabled the right to
deduct, understood by the ECJ as an objective entitlement
applicable uniformly throughout the EU, to internalize
objectives of tax efficiency as raised by the Member States.
Special attention will be paid to how the ECJ has mana-
ged to reconcile the aim of ensuring the collection of
revenues and preventing fraud and other abusive practices
with the objective legal position guaranteed to taxable
persons in the common system of VAT, as guaranteed
by the principles of fiscal neutrality and legal certainty.
Finally, the article examines the assessment by the ECJ of
the restrictions imposed in individual cases on grounds of
national tax policy considerations on the right to deduct
as carried out in the framework of review developed to
scrutinize the necessity (proportionality) of those restric-
tions. The new case law analysed here indicates a rein-
forced understanding by the ECJ that the healthy and
balanced operation of the VAT system in the single
market requires not only robust individual rights for
taxable persons, but also potent and capable tax adminis-
trations at the national level.
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2 VAT DEDUCTION AS AN EU
(FUNDAMENTAL) RIGHT
The right of taxable persons to deduct input VAT is
regulated in EU tax legislation as a central operational
component of the common system of VAT.1 Articles 168–
177 of Directive 2006/112/EC2 (the VAT Directive)
define the right to deduct by regulating the circumstances
in which it may be exercisable. Its exercise is subjected to
formal-technical conditions which are defined explicitly in
Article 178, such as holding of a lawful invoice and
compliance with the formalities laid down in relation to
specific taxable transactions. Article 179 specifies the
timeframe when the deduction must take place. Further
legislative provisions include Articles 180–183, which
enable the Member States to depart from the Directive’s
requirements subject to conditions and detailed rules. The
Directive also identifies those cases when the exercise of
the right to deduct may be restricted (Articles 176–177),
for example the restricting of deductions for ‘cyclical
economic reasons’. Article 273 permits, with general
effect, the Member States to impose at their own discre-
tion ‘obligations’ which are necessary to prevent tax eva-
sion and ensure the correct collection of VAT.
In the case law of the ECJ, which has from the
beginning relied directly on the general principles
and detailed rules of the different VAT Directives,3
the right to deduct is interpreted as an objective4 legal
entitlement the exercise of which is imperative to
securing the neutral taxation of economic activities
within the common system of VAT.5 The jurispruden-
tial formulas label the right to deduct as a ‘fundamen-
tal principle’, which forms an ‘integral part’ of the
European VAT regime6 and which ‘may not be lim-
ited’ and ‘is exercisable immediately’.7 The interpreta-
tion of the ECJ, especially when determining the
limitations on the powers of national tax authorities,
regularly falls back on the general principle of fiscal
neutrality and the general requirement, integral to
that principle, of securing equal treatment and equal
competition in the single market’s system of turnover
taxation.8 The fundamental principle of legal cer-
tainty, tied intimately to the principle of neutrality,
has served an essential role in the legal development of
the right of deduction, in particular by insisting on its
binding legal force.9 The interpretative framing of the
right to deduct was also influenced by the emphasis on
the uniform and objective character of the definitions,
distinctions and other rules of the VAT Directives.10
For further interpretative support, the ECJ has fre-
quently made the claim that the legislator had inten-
tionally established a ‘very wide scope’ for VAT.11
Based on its objective character, the right to deduct has
been interpreted pronouncedly as exercisable without
Notes
1 The right to deduct plays a ‘central function’ in the EU VAT mechanism designed to ensure complete neutrality of the tax and has the ‘specific function’ of ensuring the
neutrality of VAT. IT: ECJ, 18 Dec. 2014, Case C-131/13, Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2455, para. 48. For an early overview of the legislative
pathways for creating a common system of turnover taxation, see K. V. Antal, Harmonisation of Turnover Taxes in the Common Market, 1 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1963). On
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different models of turnover taxation from the perspective of European integration, see ibid., at 50.
2 EU VAT Directive (2006): Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of value added tax (as most recently amended by Directive 2008/8/EU,
text applicable with effect from 1 Jan. 2015), OJ L347/1 (11 Dec. 2006).
3 See e.g. RO: ECJ, 9 July 2015, Case C-183/14, Salomie and Oltean, ECLI:EU:C:2015:454, para. 55. The right to deduct is regulated in ‘explicit and precise terms’ in EU
legislation. HU: ECJ, 23 Apr. 2009, Case C-74/08, PARAT Automotive Cabrio Textiltetőket Gyártó Kft. v. Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal, Hatósági Főosztály, Észak-
magyarországi Kihelyezett Hatósági Osztály, ECLI:EU:C:2009:261, paras 14–17.
4 In a tax system based on neutrality, it is unavoidable that taxpayers are taxed according to objective characteristics/that their taxation position is objective. In this regard, see
UK: ECJ, 6 Apr. 1995, Case C-4/94, BLP Group v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ECLI:EU:C:1995:107, para. 26.
5 There is disagreement among commentators whether the approach of the ECJ in interpreting the rights of taxpayers has been overly influenced by the general purpose of the
common system of VAT within the single market. See e.g. R. de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market, Doctoral Series Vol. 16, 261–79 (IBFD 2009); M.
Ridsdale, Abuse of Rights, Fiscal Neutrality and VAT, 14 EC Tax Rev. 2, 82 (2005); P. Boria, European Tax Law: Institutions and Principles 97–99 (Giuffrè Editore 2014).
6 The purpose of the right to deduct is to relieve economic operators ‘entirely’ and ‘without delay’ of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of ‘all’ their
economic activities. E.g. BE: ECJ, 6 July 2006, Joined Cases C-439/04 & C-440/04, Alex Kittel v. Belgian State & Belgian State v. Recolta Recycling SPRL, ECLI:EU:
C:2006:446, para. 48.
7 E.g. Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, para. 47. The ECJ has confirmed the direct effect of the right to deduct and asserted that, unless allowed under EU legislation,
national authorities may not rely against a taxable person on a national provision that derogates from that right. PARAT Automotive Cabrio (C-74/08), supra n. 3, paras 32–
35.
8 On the emergence and the role of general principles in the law of the common system of VAT, see R. de la Feria, EU VAT Principles and Interpretative Aids to EU VAT Rules:
The Inherent Paradox, in Recent Developments in Value Added Tax, Series on International Tax Law 99 (M. Lang et al. eds, Linde Verlag 2015). From recent jurisprudence, see SK:
ECJ, 26 Oct. 2017, Case C-534/16, Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky v. BB construct s.r.o., ECLI:EU:C:2017:820, paras 34–42, where the legal position of the taxable
person found support in the freedom to conduct a business (Art. 16 EUCFR) and was interpreted in the context of the related requirement of an ‘unhindered use of the
financial resources’ of the taxable person. See also paras 31–33, where the ECJ denied that general obligations imposed under national tax law would have a ‘criminal’ nature
and thus guarantee the application of the criminal law principles of the EUCFR, such as ne bis in idem. See also IT: ECJ, 5 Apr. 2017, Joined Cases C-217/15 & C-350/15,
Orsi, ECLI:EU:C:2017:264.
9 E.g. UK: ECJ, 21 Feb. 2006, Case C-255/02, Halifax plc v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, para. 57. From recent jurisprudence, see HU: ECJ, 17
May 2018, Case C-566/16, Dávid Vámos v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2018:321.
10 See e.g. UK: ECJ, 12 Jan. 2006, Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 & C-484/03, Optigen Ltd (C-354/03), Fulcrum Electronics Ltd (C-355/03) and Bond House Systems Ltd (C-
484/03) v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ECLI:EU:C:2006:16, paras 36–44. The purpose of the VAT Directives was interpreted as laying down the rules on VAT in a
uniform manner and without allowing divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (the principle of uniformity). LU: ECJ, 27 Nov.
2003, Case C-497/01, Zita Modes Sàrl v. Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines, ECLI:EU:C:2003:644, para. 32.
11 Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, paras 39–41.
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significant limitations.12 As a fundamental legal bench-
mark, the ECJ has confirmed that Member State autho-
rities may impose restrictions on that right only ‘in the
cases expressly provided for’ in the VAT Directive.13 In
harmony with the general VAT principles, such restric-
tions may be acceptable only when they are applied in a
similar manner in all Member States.14 Furthermore, it
has been repeatedly held that the right to deduct must be
exercisable as ordered by EU legislation without regard to
the ‘purpose or results’ of taxable transactions,15 or to the
‘intentions’ of other traders (and of the taxable person) and
the (illicit) nature of the transactions carried out by
them.16 The assessment of such subjective or factual cir-
cumstances in the exercise of the right to deduct was
considered by the ECJ as contravening the core objectives
of the EU VAT system, namely the ensuring of legal
certainty in taxable transactions and facilitating – having
regard to the objective nature of taxable transactions – the
measures necessary for the application of VAT.17 The case
law also indicated that the exercise of the right to deduct
is independent from the actual payment of the VAT,18
and rejected, with reference to the principle of neutrality,
that it could be made dependent on general distinctions
between lawful and unlawful transactions.19
The principle of fiscal neutrality, which is implemented
in the real economy through the exercise of the right of
deduction,20 has set as its principled basis a particular path
for the interpretative framing of the right to deduct. As a
fundamental principle of the common system of VAT,21 it
requires – and for that purpose relies on – the right to
deduct, that in the single market all economic activities are
taxed ‘in a wholly neutral way’.22 The neutrality of taxation
is closely linked to the general objective of market
integration23; it secures a neutrality of competition in an
integrated market by requiring that in each Member State
similar goods and services bear the same tax burden, and
fosters cross-border trade by making known the amount of
the tax burden borne, as well as by enabling ‘an exact
equalisation’ of that amount irrespective of national
boundaries.24 This fits in with the overall objective of the
First, Second25 and Sixth26 Directives and the VAT
Directive27 of preventing and eliminating distortions of
Notes
12 BE: ECJ, 15 Jan. 1998, Case C-37/95, Belgian State v. Ghent Coal Terminal NV, ECLI:EU:C:1998:1, para. 17. See also ibid., paras 19–20; BE: ECJ, 29 Feb. 1996, Case C-110/
94, INZO v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1996:67, paras 20–21. See also the case law on ordering the retrospective repayment of fraudulently deducted VAT, which possibility
served as another reason for delimiting the discretion of national authorities. PL: ECJ, 1 Mar. 2012, Case C-280/10, Kopalnia Odkrywkowa Polski Trawertyn P. Granatowicz, M.
Wąsiewicz spółka jawna v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu, ECLI:EU:C:2012:107, paras 36–37; DK: ECJ, 3 Mar. 2005, Case C-32/03, I/S Fini H v. Skatteministeriet, ECLI:
EU:C:2005:128, para. 33.
13 E.g. LT: ECJ, 21 Oct. 2010, Case C-385/09, Nidera Handelscompagnie BV v. Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos, ECLI:EU:C:2010:627,
para. 41. See also the case law on the requirement of declaring in good faith the beginning of taxable economic activities. INZO (C-110/94), supra n. 12, paras 23–24.
14 E.g. Ghent Coal Terminal (C-37/95), supra n. 12, para. 16. See especially GR: ECJ, 6 July 1995, Case C-62/93, BP Soupergaz v. Greek State, ECLI:EU:C:1995:223, para. 18. This
rule has likely been influenced by the principle of neutrality, which requires that taxable persons are be subjected to the same level of tax burden. PARAT Automotive Cabrio
(C-74/08), supra n. 3, paras 14–17. This issue was extensively examined in the related judgment in Alakor, where neutralizing the economic burden imposed by the VAT
unduly collected provided the benchmark for assessing the obligations of national tax authorities. HU: ECJ, 16 May 2013, Case C-191/12, Alakor Gabonatermelő és
Forgalmazó Kft. v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Észak-alföldi Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2013:315, paras 24–25 & 28–33.
15 The activities of taxpayers are considered ‘per se’. Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, para. 55.
16 E.g. Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, paras 41–46.
17 Ibid., para. 42. In Halifax, in the context of distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate (abusive) uses of the rights granted under EU law, the ECJ asserted that the objective
nature of the right to deduct ensures the neutrality of the common system of VAT and held that it would be contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality, ‘and, therefore,
contrary to the purpose’ of the rules on VAT deduction, if the taxable person were allowed to deduct VAT ‘even though, in the context of their normal commercial
operations, no transactions conforming’ with the applicable deduction rules had taken place. Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 78–80.
18 E.g. Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, para. 49.
19 Ibid., para. 50 (and that it would actually be possible to make such distinctions).
20 BG: ECJ, 23 Apr. 2015, Case C-111/14, GST – Sarviz AG Germania v. Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ Plovdiv pri Tsentralno upravlenie na
Natisonalnata agentsia za prihodite, ECLI:EU:C:2015:267, para. 32.
21 BG: ECJ, 11 Apr. 2013, Case C-138/12, Rusedespred OOD v. Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane I upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ – Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata
agentsia za prihodite, ECLI:EU:C:2013:233, para. 29.
22 E.g. Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, para. 57 (and irrespective of their ‘purpose or results’).
23 The concept itself is, however, not homogenous and is rather open-ended. B. J. M. Terra, Sales Taxation: The Case of Value Added Tax in the European Community, Series on Int’l
Tax’n. 8, 15–18 (Kluwer Law International 1988). On the right to deduct, legal certainty and the prohibition of distortion of competition constituting different limbs of
neutrality, see also Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 84–87.
24 Preamble of First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 Apr. 1967 on the harmonization of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes, OJ L1301/71 (14 Apr.
1967), which also mentioned that neutrality is compatible with the idea of ‘international trade’. The harmonization of turnover taxes will eliminate distortions of
competition and, therefore, secure neutrality in competition by levelling out tax burdens in the different Member States. NL: ECJ, 1 Apr. 1982, Case C-89/81, Staatssecretaris
van Financiën v. Hong-Kong Trade Development Council, ECLI:EU:C:1982:121, para. 6. Neutrality is linked to the original impetus behind harmonizing turnover taxation in the
EU which is to avoid the distortion of cross-border competition and discrimination and to achieve market integration. Antal, supra n. 1, at 45–46.
25 Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 Apr. 1967 on the harmonization of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes – Structure and procedures for
application of the common system of value added tax, OJ L1303/67 (14 Apr. 1967).
26 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax:
uniform basis of assessment, OJ L145/1 (13 June 1977). For a brief analysis of the Sixth Directive, see J. Reugebrink, The Sixth Directive for the Harmonisation of Value Added
Tax, 15 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 3, 309 (1978).
27 In particular, see Preamble of VAT Directive, Recital 4. See also Committee of Experts set up under Ord. 1–53 of the High Authority, Report on the problems raised by the
different turnover tax systems applied within the Common Market (5 Mar. 1953) (Tinbergen Report); Neumark Committee, Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee (1962)
(Neumark Report); Commission of the European Community, White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, COM(85) 310 final (14 June 1985); Commission of the European
Intertax
326
conditions of competition and removing hindrances and
restrictions in intra-EU trade by establishing a common
system of VAT for the integrated European economy. As a
direct and specific legislative basis, neutrality can rely on
the provision first laid down in Article 2 of the First
Directive that the tax imposed must be ‘exactly propor-
tional’ to the price of goods and services28 and that the
VAT is chargeable on each transaction only after deducting
the amount of the VAT borne directly by the cost of the
various price components.29
The conjoint application, in recent case law, of the
requirement of equal treatment, which is the core
component of the neutrality principle,30 and the
related policy objective of undistorted competition
(unobstructed competitive conditions) in an integrated
marketplace31 provides a clear expression of how fun-
damentally the market integration objective of the
VAT Directive depends on ensuring the neutrality of
taxation. As emphasized by the ECJ, the equal treat-
ment of economic operators under the principle of
neutrality enables avoiding distortions of competition
in the (internal) market.32 Fiscal neutrality, which has
been interpreted as prohibiting the different treatment
of taxable persons ‘who are in comparable situations
and thus in competition with each other’ for VAT
purposes,33 was also given a distinct role in creating
a level playing field among economic operators in the
national and European markets. In the recent judg-
ment in Vámos, the ECJ held that neutrality precludes,
in particular, national tax practices which confer on
certain economic operators undue competitive advan-
tages to the detriment of others in a comparable
economic situation.34 Such competitive advantages
may include enabling certain undertakings to choose
an advantageous tax arrangement in circumstances
which are not available to others.35
When applied in case law, the principle of neutrality
has further reinforced the status of the right to deduct as
an entitlement which is fundamental to the functioning of
the common system of VAT.36 Neutrality was interpreted
by the ECJ as authorizing taxable persons to exercise their
right of deduction even in cases when its substantive
requirements are satisfied, but ‘some of the formal
requirements’ imposed have not been complied with.37
The rationale for granting this relief to taxable persons is
that the tax authorities may already have the information
necessary to allow the exercise of the right to deduct, and
imposing additional formal conditions may have the effect
of rendering it ineffective for practical purposes.38
Logically, taxable persons can be required to comply
with the formal requirements when that enables the pro-
duction of conclusive evidence concerning whether the
substantive conditions of the right to deduct have been
satisfied.39 The enforcement of nationally relevant formal
requirements also fell victim to the legal position granted
to taxpayers. National practices, supported by strict
domestic policies aimed at collecting the revenues due or
fighting fraud, which require the meeting of additional
formal requirements imposed under national law are
usually struck down by the ECJ. The relevant judicial
formula states that taxable persons must comply with the
relevant rules of the Directive only and that ‘it is not open
to Member States to make the exercise of the right to
deduct VAT dependent on compliance with conditions
Notes
Community, Completion of the Internal Market: Approximation of Indirect Tax Structures and Harmonisation of Indirect Tax Structure, COM(87) 320 final (26 Aug. 1987);
Commission of the European Community, A Strategy to Improve the Operation of the VAT System within the Context of the Internal Market, COM(2000) 348 final (7 June 2000).
28 According to de la Feria, this rule regulates the principle of neutrality in general, which provides the basis of the right to deduct and the principle of fiscal neutrality strictu
senso, which latter serves as the basis of the requirements of uniformity, equal treatment and equal (undistorted) competition. de la Feria, supra n. 5, at 263–264.
29 In this regard, see spelling out the related obligations of national tax authorities in Sarviz Germania (C-111/14), supra n. 20, para. 40; LT: ECJ, 28 Feb. 2018, Case C-387/16,
Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos v. Nidera BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:121, paras 24–25.
30 E.g. Vámos (C-566/16), supra n. 9, para. 46. When the Member States regulate the exercise of the right to deduct in order to give effect to the principle of equal treatment as
embedded in the neutrality principle, the restrictions thus imposed cannot be contested on the basis of the latter principle. DK: ECJ, 29 Oct. 2009, Case C-174/08, NCC
Construction Danmark v. Skatteministeriet, ECLI:EU:C:2009:669, para. 46.
31 NCC Construction (C-174/08), supra n. 30, para. 27. In this regard, see C. Amand, VAT Neutrality: A Principle of EU Law or a Principle of the VAT System, 2(3) World J. VAT/
GST L. 161, 162–63 (2013).
32 NCC Construction (C-174/08), supra n. 30, para. 44.
33 Vámos (C-566/16), supra n. 9, para. 58. See also BB construct (C-534/16), supra n. 8, para. 29 (the ECJ set out to examine whether the groups of persons affected by the national
restriction are in a comparable situation. The principle of equal treatment was also examined separately with the purpose of determining the comparability of the relevant
groups of taxable persons). Ibid., paras 43–46. See also BG: ECJ, 5 Oct. 2016, Case C-576/15, ЕТ ‘Маya Маrinova’ v. Direktor na Direktsia „Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna
praktika“ Veliko Tarnovo pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite, ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para. 49. For extensive analyses of the comparability of taxable
persons in recent case law, see UK: ECJ, 14 June 2017, Case C-38/16, Compass Contract Services Limited v. Commissioners for HMRC, ECLI:EU:C:2017:454, paras 24–28; PL:
ECJ, 8 Sept. 2016, Case C-390/15, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO), ECLI:EU:C:2017:174.
34 Vámos (C-566/16), supra n. 9, para. 47.
35 Vámos (C-566/16), supra n. 9.
36 Neutrality, interpreted together with the proportionality principle, is responsible for the line of case law which identified the obligation of national tax systems to provide
for the adjustment of any tax improperly invoiced. Rusedespred (C-138/12), supra n. 21, paras 26–29.
37 E.g. Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, paras 58–61. See in particular, Polski Trawertyn (C-280/10), supra n. 12, paras 44–49.
38 E.g. Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, para. 59.
39 BG: ECJ, 12 July 2012, Case C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport OOD v. Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ Plovdiv, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458, para. 71.
See also assessment in IT: ECJ, 28 July 2016, Case C-332/15, Astone, ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, paras 54–57.
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[…] which are not expressly laid down’ by EU
legislation.40
3 TAX EFFICIENCY AND THE RIGHT TO
DEDUCT
As indicated above, the right to deduct as supported by
the principle of fiscal neutrality had emerged in the
jurisprudence as a legal entitlement that serves primarily
the market integration objective(s) of EU turnover tax
harmonization. However, the ECJ was soon confronted
with the weaknesses of this approach in an economic
reality with opportunities for aggressive tax planning
leading to tax evasion, as well as for other fraudulent
and abusive conduct damaging the taxation interests of
the Member States. Many of these opportunities have, in
fact, arisen from the introduction of VAT as a common
fiscal burden in Europe, especially in the context of cross-
border trade in an integrated market.41 However, the
damaging fiscal consequences of taxpayer conduct have
brought to light the importance of finding a balance
between the different objectives of the common system
of VAT, in particular between the neutrality of taxation
and the efficient operation of national VAT regimes and,
with that, the EU VAT system.42 In order to address these
challenges and respond to hardening Member State tax
enforcement practices, the ECJ decided to expand the
narrow framework that had been mapped out in the
jurisprudence for the right to deduct and place emphasis
on considerations of tax efficiency when interpreting that
right.43 The jurisprudential move was controversial and
the ECJ proceeded with perceptible caution.
The creation of an ‘abuse of law’ limb for the jurispru-
dence in order to address fraud committed by the taxable
person44 and the later establishment of third-party
responsibility for fraud committed in a chain of supply
(so-called ‘carousel fraud’ or ‘missing trader fraud’)45
transformed the legal position of taxable persons by
excluding that, in defence of their right to deduct, they
rely in such situations on the objective character of that
right.46 As part of this significant change, the relevant
judgments openly confirmed the power of national autho-
rities to investigate and then validate transactions sus-
pected of fraud or abuse by using the objective evidence
they could collect in their investigations.47 The central
principle was anchored in Halifax, where the ECJ held
that the right to deduct cannot be relied on for abusive or
fraudulent ends and used to cover up abusive practices.48
National authorities were, thus, allowed to preclude the
exercise or retention of the right to deduct when the
‘transactions from which that right derives constitute an
abusive practice’.49 Later case law also established that
taxable persons are prevented from exercising the right
to deduct when they knew or should have known (‘had
reasonable grounds to suspect’) that other transactions in
the chain of supply were vitiated by fraud.50 In such
circumstances, the taxable person must be regarded as a
participant in tax fraud irrespective of whether or not such
person profited from the transactions carried out.51
The new principles were met with harsh criticism from
commentators. It was asserted that the newly found
Notes
40 E.g. Polski Trawertyn (C-280/10), supra n. 12, paras 41–42. See also HU: ECJ, 6 Sept. 2012, Case C-324/11, Gábor Tóth v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Észak-magyarországi
Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2012:549, paras 22–33. Even the VAT Directive’s formal requirements can be overlooked when, without jeopardizing the national
authority’s position, they render the right to deduct ineffective, and when, taking into account the ‘important documentary functions’ of invoices, the relevant information
can be legitimately established using other means. Polski Trawertyn (C-280/10), supra n. 12, paras 44–46, 48.
41 In detail, see de la Feria, supra n. 5, at 100–101; R. de la Feria, The European Court of Justice’s Solution to Aggressive VAT Planning: Further Towards Legal Uncertainty?, 15(1) EC
Tax Rev. 27, 34 (2006); Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 93–94. Generally, under a system of VAT, economic operators are incentivized to lessen their fiscal burdens, including the
burden of the VAT not recovered, which then leads to continuous efforts to mitigate such costs through aggressive VAT planning. Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 82.
42 Introducing VAT as an own resource of the EU budget played an important role in making tax efficiency a more carefully guarded EU interest.
43 R. de la Feria, Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law, OUCBT Working Paper 18/02, 16–20 & 32 (Jan. 2018) (also arguing that the inefficiency of the VAT system may ultimately
undermine the rule of law).
44 For an analysis of its evolution, see R. de la Feria, Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation of a New General Principle of EC Law Through Tax, 45(2) Com. Mkt. L.
Rev. 395, 418–24 (2008).
45 For a brief overview, see ibid. Fraud, in particular ‘carousel fraud’, was identified as a serious problem in the common system of VAT. See Completion of the internal market:
approximation of indirect tax structures and harmonization of indirect tax structure, supra n. 27; A strategy to improve the operation of the VAT system within the context
of the Internal Market, supra n. 27.
46 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 59–69. The principle of fiscal neutrality may not be legitimately invoked when the taxable person intentionally participated
in tax evasion and jeopardized the operation of the common system of VAT. Astone (C-332/15), supra n. 39, para. 58. Nor may they rely on the principles of protection of
legitimate expectations or legal certainty to exonerate fraudulent conduct. Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti (C-131/13), supra n. 1, para. 60. However, the risk of VAT
evasion or abuse alone is insufficient to justify a restriction on the right to deduct (as it follows from the strict provisions of the directive). Polski Trawertyn (C-280/10), supra
n. 12, paras 36–37.
47 de la Feria, supra n. 43, at 30–31 (also criticizing this ‘responsibilization’ turn in the jurisprudence for undermining the rule of law and fundamental rights). For a structural
criticism challenging the impact on taxable persons and Member State tax policies, see de la Feria, supra n. 41, at 35.
48 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 68–69.
49 Ibid., paras 83–85.
50 E.g. Optigen and Others (C-354/03, C-355/03 & C-484/03), supra n. 10, para. 52. The formula denotes a ‘conscious participation, or participation which must have been
conscious’ in a chain of supply affected by fraud. Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti (C-131/13), supra n. 1, para. 66.
51 E.g. HU: ECJ, 21 June 2012, Joined Cases C-80/11 & C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, ECLI:EU:C:2012:373, para. 46. In such a situation, the taxable person aids the
perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice. Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, para. 57.
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emphasis on tax efficiency objectives lacked a legal (leg-
islative) basis, and their application by the ECJ contra-
dicts the purpose and the principles of the common
system of VAT52 and ignores the objective nature of the
rights of taxable persons.53 The ECJ was seen as risking a
violation of the expectation by taxable persons that their
conduct will be assessed on the basis of the principle of
neutrality and its complementary principle, the principle
of legal certainty.54 These observations seem overly harsh.
As revealed by its reasoning, the ECJ had anticipated
these issues and made a conscious effort to reconcile the
newly introduced principles with the principle of neutral-
ity and its implications for the legal position of taxable
persons. In Halifax, the judgment emphasized that legal
certainty, which safeguards the position of taxable persons
in the VAT system, must be observed,55 and held, with
reference to that principle and the requirement of foresee-
able application, that illegal conduct by the taxable person
may be established only in very specific circumstances and
when supported by sufficient ‘objective’ evidence56 col-
lected by the tax authority.57
Similarly, in the case of third-party responsibility, the
ECJ aimed to soften the impact of the new rule by
imposing the burden on national authorities to collect
objective evidence and prove on that basis the fraudulent
or abusive nature of the conduct.58 It made it clear, in
particular, that the taxable person cannot be burdened
with absolute responsibility for the alleged fraud and
that national authorities must establish, ‘to the requisite
legal standard,59 that the taxable person knew, or ought
to have known’ the fraud committed by others in the
chain of supply.60 Further safeguards were introduced
when the ECJ held that the taxable person cannot be
obliged, with a general effect, to carry out a full-blown
investigation into the economic circumstances of other
traders, which task falls within the responsibility of the
national authorities,61 and that they may be required to
take only (precautionary) steps ‘which could reasonably be
required’ from them.62
The ECJ’s move, which introduced an interpretative
construction aiming to provide an overall balanced
response to the concerns of national tax administrations,
received further support when judicial reasoning made it
explicit that preventing tax evasion and avoidance and
fighting fraud and abuse are recognized objectives of,
and are encouraged by the VAT Directive.63 The pro-
blems faced by national tax jurisdictions were further
alleviated when the judgment in Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’
Mariano Previti established the opportunity for national
authorities and courts to apply the ‘abuse of law’ principle
Notes
52 Which is fiscal neutrality. For a critical comment that the right to deduct may only be denied when dictated by the principle of fiscal neutrality, see Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at
92.
53 Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 89–90 & 93 (also arguing that the ‘abuse of law’ principle must be applied as a strict exception which must be reserved to cases of extreme and
manifestly aggressive tax planning).
54 Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 90–92 (nevertheless, conceding that the principle may follow from a broader reading of the purpose of the relevant EU rules, which he saw as too
uncertain and violating legal certainty); de la Feria, supra n. 43, at 34. In contrast, see T. Tridimas, Abuse of Rights in EU Law with a Focus on Financial Law, in Prohibition of
Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law? 169–191, 191 (R. de la Feira & S. Vogenauer eds, Hart 2011); J. Freedman, The Anatomy of Tax Avoidance Counteraction:
Abuse of Law in a Tax Context at Member State and European Union Level, in Prohibition of Abuse of Law. A New General Principle of EU Law? 365–380, 369 (R. de la Feira & S.
Vogenauer eds, Hart 2011).
55 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, para. 72 (legal certainty in the sense that individuals know precisely the extent of the obligations imposed on them). It also
confirmed that economic operators, in particular when they are offered legitimate taxation choices, have a right under EU law to limit their tax liability, in para. 73. In
Tridimas’ assessment, with this paragraph the judgment ensured that the abuse of law principle is able to establish a balance ‘between, on the one hand, preventing the
claiming of unjustified tax benefits and, on the other hand, the need to ensure certainty and foreseeability in the application of Community legislation’. Tridimas, supra n.
54, at 174.
56 The threshold of proof was set high: abuse cannot be established ‘where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax
advantages’; only transactions driven by taxation reasons which (essentially) aim at circumventing tax rules are caught by the new principle. Halifax and Others (C-255/02),
supra n. 9, para. 75.
57 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 71–75.
58 E.g. Mahagében and Dávid (C-80/11 & C-142/11), supra n. 51, paras 42 & 46. In the particular context of the judgment in Federation of Technological Industries, the ECJ
indicated that the objective evidence collected constitutes a presumption of liability which is rebuttable on proof supplied by the taxable person; ‘such presumptions may not
be formulated in such a way as to make it practically impossible or excessively difficult for the taxable person to rebut them with evidence to the contrary’. UK: ECJ, 11 May
2006, Case C-384/04, Commissioners of Customs & Excise and Attorney General v. Federation of Technological Industries and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:309, paras 31–32.
59 Summary proof of fraud is not acceptable. HU: ECJ, 16 May 2013, Case C-444/12, Hardimpex Kft, in liquidation v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Ügyek és Adózók Adó
Főigazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2013:318, para. 27. A strict system of liability where no proof is collected concerning the part of the taxable person in the fraud is prohibited.
BG: ECJ, 6 Dec. 2012, Case C-285/11, Bonik EOOD v. Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ – Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za
prihodite, ECLI:EU:C:2012:774, paras 41–42.
60 Mahagében and Dávid (C-80/11 & C-142/11), supra n. 51, para. 42. The obligation to provide objective proof ‘to the requisite legal standard’ was connected by the ECJ to the
claim that the right of deduction cannot be regarded as ‘an exception to the application of the fundamental principle constituted by that right’. Astone (C-332/15), supra n.
39, para. 52. The rule of law offers another explanation: the proof of fraudulent conduct and the evidence collected must be open to judicial review and must be able to
withstand judicial scrutiny in that process. Hardimpex (C-444/12), supra n. 59, paras 28–29.
61 Hardimpex (C-444/12), supra n. 59, paras 26–27. See also Tóth (C-324/11), supra n. 40, paras 41–45. In Tóth, the ECJ also rejected, on grounds of the objective nature of the
right to deduct, that an overall assessment of the circumstances of the conduct could replace proof based on objective evidence. Tóth (C-324/11), supra n. 40, paras 47–51.
62 Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, para. 51 (e.g. examine the trustworthiness of other traders). Such traders (traders that are not in the position to recognize, even by
exercising due commercial care, that others in the chain of supply had acted fraudulently) must be able to rely on the legality of their transactions without the risk of being
made liable for the fraud committed by others. Federation of Technological Industries and Others (C-384/04), supra n. 58, para. 33.
63 E.g. SK: ECJ, 21 Mar. 2018, Case C-533/16, Volkswagen AG v. Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky, ECLI:EU:C:2018:204, para. 48; Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti
(C-131/13), supra n. 1, para. 68.
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despite the lack of provisions under national law to the
same effect.64 In that ruling, the ECJ openly discussed
that fraudulent transactions often hide behind the objec-
tive legislative terms of the Directive and exploit the
objectiveness of the rights provided for taxable persons,
and concluded that a failure to recognize the possibility of
abuse ‘would not comply with’ the directive’s tax effi-
ciency objectives.65 Overall, the jurisprudence seems now
better prepared to give a green light to the implementa-
tion of tax efficiency objectives in the Member States
affected severely by fraud or other forms of abuse, even
if that may come at the cost of exposing the exercise of
taxpayers’ rights to uncertainties, in particular those
emerging from proving and disproving fraudulent or abu-
sive conduct.
4. PROPORTIONALITY, COUNTERVAILING
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE RIGHT
TO DEDUCT
The integration of tax efficiency objectives into the inter-
pretative framework developed for the right to deduct was
given a further impetus when the case law opened up to
examining the necessity (proportionality) of national
restrictions.66 This found its basis in the jurisprudence
recognizing, with reference to the VAT Directive, that the
rights of taxable persons (including the right to deduct)
can be restricted on general interest grounds, such as
ensuring the correct collection of tax and the proper
functioning of the EU VAT system,67 and preventing
and fighting tax evasion and avoidance and other kinds
of tax abuse and fraud.68 In general, the case law has
produced a rather cautious scrutiny of the tax policy
objectives pursued by Member State administrations;
their relationship with the principle of neutrality and
legal certainty69; and the impact of that relationship on
the objective entitlements of taxpayers.70 The ECJ
insisted that national restrictions must provide a propor-
tionate response to the tax efficiency problem addressed
and observe, by enabling an equal exercise of taxpayer
rights, the principle of fiscal neutrality. Recent rulings,
in domains where the Member States are granted discre-
tion under EU law in implementing tax efficiency objec-
tives, however, reveal an increased readiness by the ECJ to
endorse the concerns of national tax jurisdictions about
their ability to enforce anti-fraud policies and secure the
efficiency of turnover taxation.71
The caution of the ECJ can be explained by the earlier
mentioned controversies of giving more emphasis in judi-
cial interpretation to the objective of tax efficiency,72 in
particular the potential conflict with the principle of
neutrality.73 In the seminal ruling in Halifax, the ECJ
decided to keep the assessment of the competing policy
objectives of neutral and efficient taxation within the
general framework of the ‘abuse of law’ principle and,
thus, shaped the relationship between the interests of
national tax administrations and the rights of taxable
persons by stating categorically (objectively) that if fraud
is proved using objective evidence, the right of deduction
is not available. The judgment also developed, in a two-
part legal test, the details of when abuse or fraud, as
virtually the only legitimate reasons, may exclude the
exercise of the right to deduct. Accordingly, when
national authorities and courts investigate transactions
allegedly affected by fraud, they need to establish whether
the transaction – despite complying with the relevant
formal conditions – resulted in ‘the accrual of a tax
advantage’ contrary to purpose of the VAT Directive and
Notes
64 Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti (C-131/13), supra n. 1, paras 54–57. The possibility that the ‘abuse of law’ principle may override the neutrality principle was seen by
de la Feria as permissible in light of the jurisprudence which has consistently interpreted the neutrality principle not as a ‘rule of primary law but a principle of
interpretation’. DE: ECJ, 19 July 2012, Case C-44/11, Finanzamt Frankfurt am Main V-Höchst v. Deutsche Bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:2012:484, para. 45; DE: ECJ, 13 Mar. 2014,
Case C-204/13, Finanzamt Saarlouis v. Heinz Malburg, ECLI:EU:C:2014:147, para. 43; de la Feria, supra n. 42, at 34. In NCC Construction, the ECJ distinguished between the
general principle of equal treatment, which ‘has constitutional status’, and equal treatment demanded by the neutrality principle, which ‘requires legislation to be drafted
and enacted’ for it to be enforceable. NCC Construction (C-174/08), supra n. 30, paras 41–43.
65 Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti (C-131/13), supra n. 1, paras 67–68.
66 FR: ECJ, 19 Sept. 2000, Joined Cases C-177/99 & C-181/99, Ampafrance and Sanofi, ECLI:EU:C:2000:470, paras 57–62 (assessing the compatibility of a Council decision,
which excluded in the interest of preventing tax evasion and avoidance the deductibility of input VAT, with the principle of neutrality and proportionality).
67 E.g. Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, para. 39.
68 E.g. Mahagében and Dávid (C-80/11 & C-142/11), supra n. 51, para. 41.
69 On the application of legal certainty in support of the taxable person, see e.g. Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 93–96; RO: ECJ, 6 Feb. 2014, Case C-424/12,
SC Fatorie SRL v. Direcţia Generală a Finanţelor Publice Bihor, ECLI:EU:C:2014:50, para. 46; Astone (C-332/15), supra n. 39, para. 33. Legal certainty has also been applied to
support the legitimate interests of national tax administrations. Nidera (C-385/09), supra n. 13, paras 50–52; Astone (C-332/15), supra n. 39, paras 34, 37–38; Salomie and
Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, paras 41–42.
70 de la Feria offers a critical assessment of the different positions taken by the ECJ in non-harmonized and in extensively harmonized areas, such as VAT, where it has been
more withdrawn and the intensity of its scrutiny of national policies and regulation has been lower. R. de la Feria, VAT and the EC Single Market: The Shortcomings of
Harmonisation, OUCBT Working Paper 09/29 35–36 (2009).
71 See also Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti (C-131/13), supra n. 1, paras 51–52 (emphasizing that it is a responsibility and an obligation of national authorities and courts,
even where there are no specific provisions in national law to that effect, to refuse the exercise of the right to deduct in case of fraud, as the prevention of fraud ‘applies as a
general principle of law in the application of the national provisions transposing’ the Directive).
72 See also De la Feria, supra n. 43, at 24–25.
73 Ridsdale, supra n. 5, at 82; de la Feria, supra n. 5, at 275–77 (also asserting that tackling the actual taxation problem of aggressive VAT planning is not a judicial, but rather
a policy-making and legislative task).
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whether there are objective factors which make it evident
that the ‘essential aim’ of the transaction was to obtain a
tax advantage.74
In Kittel, the judgment was quite explicit about its
reluctance to undertake an examination of the national
restrictions outside the bounds of the legal test developed
for third-party liability. It can be discerned from the
judicial reasoning that having introduced the liability of
the taxable person for fraud committed by others in a
chain of supply, the ECJ felt that jurisprudence had
already done enough, without jeopardizing the objective-
ness of taxpayer rights and the neutrality of taxation in
the single market as ensured by uniform and objective
legal rules, to warrant that it is ‘more difficult to carry out
fraudulent transactions’.75 The application of the same
legal test in Mahagében and Dávid also demonstrates that
the ECJ is satisfied that the tax efficiency considerations of
the common system of VAT can be given due effect
within the framework of the VAT Directive and in the
context of the national administrative procedures initiated
to investigate fraud.76 The judgment in Federation of
Technological Industries, concerning the introduction in
national law of joint and several liability for taxpayers in
a chain of supply, at first seemed prepared to abandon this
rather cautious judicial approach. The main reason for this
was that the applicable provision of EU VAT legislation77
provided an explicit legal basis for the adoption of such
national measures. Ultimately, the ECJ chose, however, to
determine the proportionality of the national restriction
on the basis of an aspect familiar from the general legal
test, namely whether the taxable person had been given an
opportunity to challenge the restriction by relying on
proof capable of contradicting the objective evidence col-
lected by the tax authorities.78
In cases concerning the enforcement of formal require-
ments by national authorities, the scrutiny by the ECJ was
similarly oriented.79 While the ECJ was prepared to
examine the necessity of national restrictions in light of
the mainly efficiency-driven tax policy objectives pursued,
it also expected them to comply with the principle of
neutrality.80 In Sarviz Germania, dealing with invoicing
irregularities, the ECJ examined a national rule which
placed the fiscal burden for the irregularities on the tax-
able person, and struck down that rule for violating the
neutrality principle.81 In this regard, it was decisive that
no opportunities for correction and, with that, the recov-
ery of VAT and the exercise of the right to deduct were
provided. It also warned that such restrictions enabling
strict VAT enforcement may be regarded as necessary only
when there is an ‘actual’ risk of loss of tax.82 In the similar
Rusedespred case, the ECJ made it explicit, on the basis of
the principles of neutrality and effectiveness (of remedies),
that the conditions under national law for the refund of
improperly invoiced VAT must not make the refund
impossible or excessively difficult, and held that the
Member States must provide for the ‘instruments’ and
‘detailed procedural rules’ necessary for taxable persons
to exercise their rights.83 Having regard to the circum-
stances of the case, it declared the formal condition laid
down in national law protecting the institutional position
of national tax authorities, which was ‘impossible to
satisfy’, as excessive.84
The judicial scrutiny in Halifax of the reparations
ordered by the national authorities followed a similar
legal construction of allowing the assessment of the
national tax policy objective but also demanding compli-
ance with the principle of neutrality.85 The limb of the
legal dispute, which concerned Member State measures
Notes
74 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, para. 86. The requirement of ‘essential aim’ was relaxed to ‘principal aim’ in the Part Service case. IT: ECJ, 21 Feb. 2008, Case C-
425/06, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, formerly Ministero delle Finanze v. Part Service Srl, ECLI:EU:C:2008:108, para. 62 (in principle, allowing for a broader scrutiny of
what practices can be permitted or prohibited).
75 Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n. 6, paras 58–59 (the legal test as developed in the case law ‘is apt to prevent’ such transactions).
76 Supra n. 58 and 60. See also the assessment in Kittel concerning whether sufficient objective evidence has been collected and presented. Kittel (C-439/04 & C-440/04), supra n.
6, paras 55, 57 & 59.
77 Art. 21 Sixth Directive.
78 Federation of Technological Industries (C-384/04), supra n. 58, paras 24–30 & 31–33.
79 In this regard, see the assessment in Fatorie (C-424/12), supra n. 69, paras 37–44 (concerning formal requirements which were imposed under national tax law to avoid the
risk of a loss of tax revenue).
80 Formal requirements imposed within national discretion must not go further than necessary and must not undermine the neutrality of VAT. IT: ECJ, 11 Dec. 2014, Case C-
590/13, Idexx Laboratories Italia v. Agenzia delle Entrate, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2429, paras 35 & 37.
81 Sarviz Germania (C-111/14), supra n. 20, paras 35–38. The ECJ referred to the specific legislative manifestation of neutrality that there must be ‘exact proportionality’
between the tax burden and the price of goods and services, which rule excludes the collection of excessive (disproportionate) tax and imposes the obligation on national tax
administrations to enable the correction of invoicing irregularities.
82 Sarviz Germania (C-111/14), supra n. 20, paras 39–41. See also supra n. 46.
83 Rusedespred (C-138/12), supra n. 21, para. 30. It also asserted in para. 28 that national restrictions pursuing objectives of tax efficiency must not go beyond what is necessary
and may not, therefore, be used in such a way that they would have the effect of undermining the neutrality of VAT as a fundamental principle.
84 Rusedespred (C-138/12), supra n. 21, paras 31–34.
85 The Court pointed out in Fatorie, under the claim that legal certainty had been violated, that in the absence of EU harmonization in the field of tax penalties, the Member
States retain the power to choose penalties ‘which they seem to them to be appropriate’; that power must, however, be exercised in accordance with EU law and its general
principles, including the principle of proportionality. Fatorie (C-424/12), supra n. 69, para. 50. Penalties introduced in the interest of tax efficiency considerations will be
proportionate if they take into account the nature and the degree of seriousness of the infringement, and express those factors adequately in their amount. HU: ECJ, 26 Apr.
2017, Case C-564/15, Tibor Farkas v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-alfödi Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2017:302, para. 60.
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introduced in the absence of applicable EU provisions to
regulate the recovery of VAT and recover the unpaid
VAT, was decided in the following way. First, the ECJ
made it clear that the discretion available to the Member
States must be exercised ‘within the limits imposed’ by
EU law and the measures introduced in national discre-
tion must not go beyond what is necessary.86 Then, as
recurrent in other areas of the jurisprudence, it reminded
the Member States that their actions must not undermine
the neutrality of the VAT system as required by EU
law.87 It concluded its assessment by emphasizing, with
reference to the principles of the common system of VAT
and in harmony with the legal formula introduced earlier,
that when the taxable person is cleared of allegations of
illicit conduct, the national authorities must allow it to
exercise its objective entitlement to deduct VAT after
input transactions.88
In the instances when EU tax legislation explicitly
empowers the Member States to introduce – in national
discretion – measures necessary for realizing tax efficiency
objectives, the ECJ will, in general, subject national
restrictions on the right to deduct to a scrutiny which
seems to be less constrained than that in the earlier men-
tioned cases and generally more sensitive towards national
tax policy interests.89 In Gabalfrisa, concerning national
restrictions introduced under Article 22(8) of the Sixth
Directive, the ECJ appeared to have given a more closely
observed examination of the tax efficiency considerations
raised when it supplemented its scrutiny under propor-
tionality by asserting that the discretion granted under
EU legislation must not be exercised so as to ‘system-
atically undermine’ the rights of taxpayers, in particular
the right to deduct.90 The case law under Article 273(1)
of the VAT Directive, which as mentioned earlier permits
the Member States to introduce additional obligations for
taxable persons in the interest of ensuring the efficient
operation of VAT, followed a largely similar judicial
approach. The ECJ examined efficiency-based national
restrictions in light of the detailed requirements of EU
law and its general principles, including the principle of
proportionality and the principles of fiscal neutrality and
legal certainty,91 but also warned against ‘systematically
undermining’ the right to deduct and the neutrality of
VAT.92 The open-ended character of this latter term may
allow the ECJ to defer to Member State discretion perhaps
more liberally than in other domains of the
jurisprudence.93
Recent judgments concerning the discretion exercised
under Article 273(1) by Member States with severe effi-
ciency problems in the local VAT system, have demon-
strated that the ECJ is indeed prepared to depart from its
original cautious approach and appreciate more fully the
difficulties faced by individual national tax administra-
tions. It signalled a shift of focus in its usual scrutiny
when it asserted that when delivering – with ‘all measures
appropriate’ – tax efficiency objectives94 within the dis-
cretion allowed under the Article 273(1), the Member
States in actual fact proceed in fulfilment of their obliga-
tions imposed under EU law.95 The weight of this change
is indicated by the ECJ bringing in Article 4(3) of the
TEU on the principle of loyalty as a legal basis alongside
the VAT Directive of the EU legal obligations referred to.
These assertions reframe what are discretionary possibili-
ties provided in EU VAT legislation for the promotion of
considerations of tax efficiency as legal obligations
imposed on national tax administrations. Arguably, this
Notes
86 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, paras 90–92. See Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, paras 50–52 (regarding the discretion of national authorities in imposing
penalties, the limits of which must be determined on the basis of the facts of the case and factors, such as the penalty actually imposed, the seriousness of the breach, and the
possibility of fraudulent or other illicit conduct by the taxable person).
87 Halifax and Others (C-255/02), supra n. 9, para. 92.
88 Ibid., para. 97.
89 In particular, see PL: ECJ, 26 Mar. 2015, Case C-499/13, Marian Macikowski v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Gdańsku, ECLI:EU:C:2015:201.
90 ES: ECJ, 21 Mar. 2000, Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa et al. v. Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, ECLI:EU:C:2000:145, paras 48–52. In the
circumstances of the case, these general benchmarks led to declaring the national restriction as well as the penalties imposed as excessive. Ibid., para. 53. See also PARAT
Automotive Cabrio (C-74/08), supra n. 3, paras 25 & 27–29 (concerning restrictions introduced under Art. 17(6) of the Sixth Directive, which were held excessive, in particular
when they are introduced in a ‘measure of general nature’ and without sufficiently distinguishing between transactions of different ‘nature or purpose’). National restrictions
will be declared as excessive when they lead to the loss of the right to deduct. Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3, para. 63. The Member States are thus required to find
less restrictive alternative solutions. Salomie and Oltean (C-183/14), supra n. 3; DE: ECJ, 15 Sept. 2016, Case C-518/14, Senatex v. Finanzamt Hannover-Nord, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:691, para. 42.
91 E.g. Vámos (C-566/16), supra n. 9, paras 36–41; BB construct (C-534/16), supra n. 8, paras 20–24.
92 RO: ECJ, 19 Oct. 2017, Case C-101/16, SC Paper Consult SRL v. Direcţia Regională a Finanţelor Publice Cluj-Napoca and Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Bistriţa
Năsăud, ECLI:EU:C:2017:775, paras 49–50.
93 However, the national restriction must not make the right to deduct ‘practically impossible or excessively difficult’ and it must not ‘systematically undermine’ the right to
deduct.
94 Which also serve the interests of the EU budget.
95 Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, para. 41; Paper Consult (C-101/16), supra n. 92, para. 47 (and Art. 325 TFEU). For the use of the same formula in an ‘abuse of law’
situation, see HU: ECJ, 17 Dec. 2015, Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses kft v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó – és Vám Főigazgatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para. 41.
See also RO: ECJ, 9 July 2015, Case C-144/14, Cabinet Medical Veterinar Dr Tomoiagă Andrei v. Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Cluj Napoca prin Administrația
Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Maramureș, ECLI:EU:C:2015:452, paras 25–26. The latter is the first in this line of cases, where the ECJ also specified the obligations of
national authorities to check the returns, accounts and other relevant documents of the taxable person and to calculate and collect the tax due. In para. 29, it asserted that the
discretion enjoyed by the Member States is ‘subject to the obligation to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s own resources and not to create significant
differences in the manner in which taxable persons are treated, either within a Member State or throughout the Member States’.
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makes the jurisdiction exercised in connection with
Article 273(1) qualitatively different from the judicial
assessments produced under other provisions of the VAT
Directives which took tax efficiency simply as an objective
of the common system of VAT.96 The shift in judicial
interpretation was prepared in Maya Marinova where the
ECJ pointed out that infringements of obligations intro-
duced to enable the correct collection of tax in national
territory, compromise the proper functioning of the com-
mon system of VAT.97 In article Consult, the ECJ rushed
to emphasize that when the Member States address tax
evasion in their own competences, they ‘undoubtedly’ act
in fulfilment of their EU obligations.98 In that judgment,
the ECJ explicitly raised the necessity of balancing the
right to deduct, as an ‘essential component of the VAT
scheme’, and the EU objective of fighting tax evasion,99
and also discussed the problems caused by VAT evasion
for both national and EU public finances.100
The actual assessment in these cases of the individual
national restrictions, in which the general formula that
national restrictions must be proportionate and must not
undermine the neutrality of VAT resurfaced,101 was per-
haps less revolutionary. In article Consult, having enlisted
numerous examples of proportionate as well as dispropor-
tionate national restrictions,102 the ECJ examined the
nature of the national measure and observed that the
obligation imposed was limited, straightforward and rea-
sonable, and, in particular, did not involve the transfer of
the national task authority’s tasks onto the taxable
person.103 Ultimately, the ECJ struck down the national
restriction on the ground which is familiar from previous
jurisprudence, that it was impossible for the taxable per-
son to demonstrate that the transactions investigated met
the VAT Directive’s conditions and that the VAT dis-
puted had already been paid into the public treasury.104
The ruling in Maya Marinova took more risks. There, the
ECJ found that the national measure was proportionate
mainly on the ground that its aim was to enable the
national tax authorities to act under their newly discov-
ered EU legal obligation to implement the tax efficiency
objectives of the VAT Directive.105 It also found that the
principle of neutrality had no relevance in the case because
the nature of the illicit conduct by the taxpayer, which
put the operation of the common system of VAT in
jeopardy, had excluded that the principle is applied to
protect the legal position of the taxpayer.106
With these rulings, the jurisprudence might have
arrived at another turning point. If the rhetoric of the
ECJ can be believed, the law on the exercise of the right to
deduct is going to be shaped – at least at the level of
principles – by contrasting the entitlements of taxable
persons, based on the objective and uniformly applicable
provisions of the VAT Directive, with the obligations of
the Member States, established under the VAT Directive,
to ensure the efficiency of the national and, with that, the
EU system of VAT. The dynamics of this process may be
influenced by the earlier mentioned development, which
occurred almost in parallel, when the ECJ re-emphasized
the role of the principle of equal treatment within the
neutrality principle and brought the specific objectives
within that principle, such as avoiding distortions of
competitive conditions in the market and maintaining a
level playing field for economic operators, to the forefront
of the judicial application of the law.107 The emphasis on
equal treatment may also have the consequence that the
ECJ eventually gives voice to the claim that without
efficient taxation (efficient national tax systems), equal
taxation in the single market cannot be realized. In
other words, for the equal treatment of taxpayers in the
common system of VAT to prevail, as mandated by the
objective (and principle) of fiscal neutrality, national tax
administrations need to be able to collect the tax due from
Notes
96 Supra n. 63. Fighting tax evasion is a tax policy objective i.e. legitimate and was ‘even imposed’ by EU law. Paper Consult (C-101/16), supra n. 92, para. 53. As in Andrei,
concrete tax efficiency-related obligations were identified, such as tax investigation obligations (ibid., para. 48) and the obligation ‘to re-establish the situation that would
have prevailed in the absence of tax evasion’. Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, para. 42.
97 Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, para. 39.
98 Paper Consult (C-101/16), supra n. 92, para. 47.
99 Ibid., para. 34.
100 Ibid., paras 44–46. See also IT: Opinion of A. G. Wahl, 22 Mar. 2018, Case C-648/16, Fortunata Silvia Fontana v. Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione provinciale di Reggio Calabria,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:213, paras 39–41.
101 Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, paras 43–44.
102 Paper Consult (C-101/16), supra n. 92, paras 51–52 (disproportionate: the tax authority’s extensive investigative tasks were transferred onto the taxable person; proportionate:
requiring a taxable person to take every step which could reasonably be required of him).
103 Paper Consult (C-101/16), supra n. 92, paras 53–55.
104 Ibid., paras 56–60. In BB construct, the judgment started with a traditional assessment of the national restriction. The ECJ found that the taxable person was prevented from
influencing the decision taken by the tax authority and the financial guarantee required was not sufficiently individualized. However, as in Maya Marinova, the principle of
neutrality was found inapplicable. BB construct (C-534/16), supra n. 8, paras 23, 26–29. On the basis of the freedom to pursue an economic activity (supra n. 8), the ECJ held
that national restriction at issue can ‘deprive, without justification, the company concerned of its resources from the moment of its creation’ and can prevent that company
‘from developing its business activities’, and is, therefore, disproportionate. BB construct (C-534/16), supra n. 8, paras 34–42.
105 Maya Marinova (C-576/15), supra n. 33, paras 47–48.
106 Ibid., para. 49.
107 Supra nn. 31–36.
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every taxable person, including those that originally
planned otherwise.
5 CONCLUSION
The contribution of the ECJ to the operation of the common
system of VAT by interpreting the right of taxable persons to
deduct input VAT has been driven by the complex system of
rules and objectives of the EU’s VAT Directives. The ECJ
framed that right as an objective legal entitlement the exercise
of which ensures the neutrality of VAT, and which should not
interfere unduly with the ability of the Member States to
maintain an efficient VAT system. Ultimately, the test of
this extensive, often highly factual jurisprudence is whether
the individual judgments have contributed to European mar-
ket integration in the manner desired by the Member States.
One significant aspect of this is whether the concerns of
individual national tax jurisdictions within the EU’s common
regime – especially those that are affected severely by fraud or
other forms of tax abuse and face as a result a significant loss of
revenue – can be taken on board, possibly without putting the
market integration objectives of the VAT Directive in
jeopardy.
Recent case law from the ECJ indicates a potential way
forward in the interpretation and the national application
of taxpayers’ objective entitlements, including the right to
deduct. The relevant judgments suggest that the exercise
of these rights can take place in the common system of
VAT without unnecessarily constraining the collection of
tax revenue due and generally the efficient operation of
national tax systems. To achieve this, the ECJ decided to
interpret the objective of tax efficiency as imposing an
obligation on national tax authorities to take the necessary
measures, especially when permitted by EU law in provi-
sions governing the policy discretion available to the
Member States. The novel jurisprudence could pose con-
siderable risks for the exercise of the supposedly objective
and universal rights guaranteed for taxpayers, as it makes
it heavily dependent on the factual circumstances of the
national restriction and exposes them to the assessment of
national authorities. Nevertheless, when the details of the
ECJ decisions are considered, it appears that objective
rights of taxpayers are interfered with only when there is
objective evidence indicating that their exercise can be
excluded of account of the conduct of the taxable person
concerned.
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